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FIRM SPECIALISATION AND GROWTH. A





This study compares internal corporate changes (new subsidiaries and other reorganisations)
and external links (mergers and acquisitions, minority participations, joint ventures and other
collaborative agreements) concerning 38 large European and US firms specialised in software
and computer services during the period between 1984 and 1992.
The paper has two main objectives. First, to show the main objectives of external and internal
growth and second, to analyse the relationship between firm specialisation in 1983 and the
patterns of firm's growth and diversification in the subsequent period (1984-1992).
Why is the software industry an interesting case study in this field? Software is a 'pervasive'
technology that is produced in many different sectors. Software users produce in-house a
significant share of their software programs. According to some estimates, internally developed
software represents about 59% of software expenditures in the largest European markets
(Germany, France, the UK and Italy) as compared with 24% of external packaged software
(acquired from specialised software producers) and 15% of outsourcing (contracted to
independent contractors) (IDC, 1990).
Despite the importance of non traded software activities, an independent software industry has
emerged since the 1970s as a consequence of 'vertical disintegration' from different business
organisations and the entry of new firms.Liuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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This process of vertical disintegration is similar to that of mechanical engineering during the
second half of the last century, which led to the spin-off of machine tool factories from many
different industries, including firearms, bicycles and automobiles (Rosenberg, 1976). Today,
many large suppliers of computer software and services have spun off from established electronic
and computer firms (e.g., GSI from Generale Electricité and Sterling Software from Sterling
Electronics) and from non electronic firms (e.g., EDS from General Motors, Scicon from British
Petroleum and Istel from British Leyland/Rover Group). The entry of innovative start-ups also
contributed to the rapid growth of the software industry during the 1980s. This has mostly
occurred in sofware packages compared with computer services.
The specialisation of software activities has been spurred by two main factors.
The first is the advances of hardware technology and the “pervasiveness” of information
technology in general, i.e. its rising use in all economic sectors. The number of software packages
for minicomputers and larger systems in the US market increased from about 5000 in 1979 to
6200 in 1982 while the suppliers rose from 900 to 2000 (Gotlieb, 1985, p. 208). The introduction
of personal computers, workstations and distributed computer networks (local area networks) in
the 1980s, have created new windows of opportunities for software firms. Large opportunities for
economies of scale have emerged in the production of software packages as a result of network
externalities produced by the emergence of standard platforms for personal computers in the
1980s (IBM PC, IBM-Microsoft's MS-DOS and Microsoft's Windows) (Steinmueller, 1986).
This has spurred vertical disintegration of software activities from hardware manufacturing.
During the 1980s most computer manufacturers have reduced their in-house production of
software and services. Moreover, the diffusion of compatible personal computers has favoured
the 'portability' of software packages on a large installed base of computers from different
producers and has accounted for the fast growth of firms which entered the market in this period,
such as Lotus (electronic spreadsheet), Microsoft (operating systems and office applications),Salvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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Ashton-Tate (data base management systems) and Novell (local area network operating systems).
In Europe the high market fragmentation, due to linguistic and cultural barriers across countries,
has reduced the opportunities for economies of scale and scope in software packages. This is one
of the factors, including the early entry and market pre-emption by US firms, that have hampered
the start-up of a European industry of packaged software (cf. Malerba and Torrisi, 1996). Most
European firms have thus specialised in services and customised software. This market segment
is populated by many small and medium-sized firms, each serving few large customers.
The second main factor that has affected the evolution of this industry is the “unbundling” of
software sales from those of computers, a practice introduced by IBM in 1969 in the US and
followed by its main competitors worldwide. The unbundling effect has reinforced the
technological change effect described above in that it has stimulated vertical disintegration of
hardware manufacturers and the entry of many specialised computer software and services firms
independent of hardware manufacturers.
As a consequence of these factors, the market for software and services has increased at a
high rate over the last decade and the average net profits in software activity have been high
compared with other information technology (IT) market segments, including computers.
Software as a share of total revenues of the largest world IT companies classified in Datamation
increased from 8.6% to 11.6% between 1988 and 1992. The share of computer services
(excluding computers maintenance)  increased over the same period from 8% to 15.6%. By
contrast, the share of hardware products (excluding data communication equipment) of these
companies has remained stable in this period (from to 34.2% to 34.8% of total revenues). The
growth of software and services revenues was mainly accounted for by specialised software
firms. Most hardware manufacturers have reduced software and services revenues as a share of
their total revenues. For instance, Digital Equipment Corporation's software and services share




 Moreover, the profitability of software firms is high compared with that of computer
firms. Datamation has compared three samples of firms selected from the world largest IT
companies. The returns on sales of software firms have passed from 12.4% in 1988 to 10.1% in
1992 while service firms' returns on sales remained stable (from 6.7% to 6.3%). Hardware firms
showed a 10.5% returns on sales ratio between 1988 and 1990 which fell to 3% in 1992
(Datamation, June 15, 1993, pp. 12-15).
The progressive reduction of margins from hardware sales and the rising importance of open
standards over recent years have spurred hardware manufacturers towards software and services.
Some of these have tried to re-enter the software market through mergers & acquisitions. For
instance, in 1995 IBM acquired Lotus Development, one of the largest US producers of software
packages. Recently, software has increased significantly as a share of total sales for many
hardware manufacturers such as IBM (from 17% in 1990 to 26% in 1992), Unisys (from 16% to
26%), Amdhal (from 2% to 20%) and Hewlett-Packard (from 3% to 8%) (Datamation, June 15,
1991 and 1993). Moreover, the largest European software firms have recently resorted to large
capital partners. Istel has been acquired by AT&T from British Leyland, Logica has agreed to be
acquired by British Telecom, Cap Gemini has sold 34% of its shares to Daimler-Benz
Interservices (Debis) and Finsiel has tried to merge with Olivetti's software division
3
. These
strategic alliances have been spurred by a reduced growth of the software market during the
1992-1994 and a lack of financial and managerial resources showed by many large European
software firms.
However, this process does not seem to bring about a complete re-integration of software
activities by hardware manufacturers or users. Hardware manufacturers that have increased their
software and services activities face strong competition from firms like Microsoft, Computer
Associates and Andersen Consulting, which are not integrated in hardware manufacturing. These
firms have strong service and organisational capabilities that are important to coordinate theSalvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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activities of many subcontractors and to serve international markets. Moreover, most software
firms have grown within the software sector or have diversified towards related activities (e.g.,
telecommunication services), whereas they have not diversified into hardware. This suggests that
there are not significant economies of scope between hardware and software activities which
justify their integration.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes vertical disintegration and
diversification in the economic literature. Section 3 illustrates the data. Section 4 discusses the
main empirical results: inter-firm linkages, internal restructuring and the trajectories of software
firms' growth. Section 5 summarises the main results and concludes the work.
2. Vertical disintegration and industry specialisation: a survey of the
literature
Economists and economic historians have explained specialisation and the division of labour




Drawing on the classical contributions of Adam Smith and Allyn Young, Stigler (1951) has
set forth the reasons why market extent for individual final products results in 'vertical
disintegration' of upstream activities. Young industries internalise most phases of their production
activities for several reasons, among which there is the lack of reliable supply of materials,
components and machinery. By contrast, maturing industries rely on a larger market for their
goods and externalisation of upstream activities becomes attainable because they enjoy economies
of scale or economies of specialisation (due to learning by doing etc.). Thus, the economies
enjoyed by the suppliers of inputs depend on the market size for final products. However, the
market size for a single final product explains only in part the division of labour among
industries. Another explanatory factor is represented by technological external economies.
Rosenberg (1976) has argued that in the second half of last century the American machine toolLiuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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industry has spun off from many industries which utilised various machine tools for two main
reasons: economies of specialisation and 'technological convergence'. With the latter he meant the
process by which the skills and techniques for handling and shaping metals or for sewing fabrics
became widespread among many different industries. Therefore the machine tool industry has
enjoyed both internal economies of scale and the external economies arising from technological
spillovers.
Patel and Pavitt (1994) have measured the importance of technological convergence and
vertical disintegration of technological activities, showing that technological capabilities in the
field of mechanical engineering (and, to a lesser extent, other ones such as chemical and
instrumentation engineering, computers, materials and biotechnology) are diffused in a wide
range of industrial sectors. This indicates that firms specialised in mechanical engineering may
access to a large pool of knowledge and benefit from technological externalities produced by
different sectors. More recently, Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) have studied the organisation of
technological activities for different technologies, showing that in mechanical engineering the
concentration of innovative activity is low, the average size of innovators is small, the hierarchy
of innovators is relatively unstable over time and the rate of entry of new innovators is high.
These studies show that the characteristics of the knowledge underpinning technological
activities, including its pervasiveness, vary across sectors affecting the organisation of innovative
activities and the evolution of the industry structure. A low concentration of innovative activities
in mechanical engineering is associated with a low market concentration compared with other
industries, such as electronics and chemicals, characterised by a high technological and market
concentration.
The literature on technical change and the division of labour among industries, however, is not
clear as to what the implications of market size and technological regimes are for the directions of
firm growth and diversification. After the stage of take off an industry will enter a stage ofSalvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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development and maturity. The theory of the firm suggests that with maturation the firms which
are active in the industry begin to diversify their business activities to exploit their excess
financial, technological and managerial resources (Penrose, 1959). However, this is not the case
of mechanical engineering firms, which do not seem to have taken advantage of their knowledge
and expertise to diversify into new businesses. Similarly, most established software firms
maintain a high degree of specialisation or diversify in businesses closely related to their core
activities. Why do they not diversify, for instance, in computer hardware or telecommunications
equipment, despite the importance of software technology for these industries?
Diversification is a process resulting from the interaction between economic and institutional
factors. In the last few years the economic literature and history of the firm have shown a
renewed interest in the analysis of the scope of firms' diversification and growth (Chandler, 1990,
Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994; Teece et alii, 1994). This interest seems to reflect the crisis of
many large multi-product companies which during the past decades have diversified their
activities in unrelated businesses. In the 1980s and 1990s, most multi-product firms have
restructured their activities and re-focused their business portfolio. This suggests that the costs of
diversification have probably increased due, for instance, to market globalisation. On the other
hand, particularly in the US, the benefits of diversification may have decreased as a consequence
of factors such as the reduction of the efficiency of firm's internal capital market compared with
the external market and the relaxation of antitrust regulation, which before the 1980s imposed
stringent limits on the possibility to reinvest profits in the main business (Markides, 1995).
Moreover, diversification varies across firms. The empirical evidence shows a bimodal or
trimodal distribution of firms which have restructured in the 1980s (Hoskisson and Johnson,
1992) - related-diversified firms have reduced their diversification while unrelated-diversified
(conglomerate) firms have increased their diversification. The level of diversification reflects the
history of the firm (including its past diversification), its technical and organisational capabilities,Liuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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and its 'corporate culture'. This may explain why empirical investigations provide mixed results
on the relationship between diversification and firm performance. Rumelt (1974), Markides
(1995) and Robbins and Wiersema (1995) show that related diversification is conducive to a
better economic performance as compared with unrelated or conglomerate diversification.
However, other empirical works indicate a weak correlation between the relatedness of business
portfolio and firm performance (Montgomery, 1985; Amit and Livnat, 1988).
The economic literature highlights several factors which limit diversification. First, there are
increasing returns to specialisation which are linked to learning by doing and dynamic economies
of scale. Second, related diversification allows the achievement of economies of scope from the
exploitation of 'excess resources' or quasi-public inputs. Third, coordination costs increases with
the variety of lines of business. That is, there are diminishing returns to diversification due to
managerial bottlenecks in the exploitation of excess resources (Montgomery and Wernerfelt,
1988)
5
. Fourth, there are financial constraints that explain why firms from mature industries
endowed with excess financial resources are more likely to become more diversified compared
with firms operating in fast growing industries, which have strong incentives to invest their
resources in the core sector because of high expected returns. Fifth, business relatedness (or a
narrow business portfolio) facilitates the implementation of incentives schemes as demonstrated
by Rotemberg and Saloner (1994). Finally, there are the firms limited cognitive resources and
capabilities. The learning process is characterised by cumulativeness, path-dependency,
idiosyncrasy and inertia which affect firms' ability to try unknown avenues of growth (Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Teece, 1988; Pavitt, 1991a; Rumelt, 1995). As a consequence, when expanding
their activities, firms attempt to do 'more of the same' or 'more of something closely related,
something of which the firm has some degree of relevant knowledge' (Winter, 1993, pp. 190-
191). This approach is consistent with the idea of the firm as an evolving stock of knowledge,Salvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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resources and capabilities, which are in part idiosyncratic and difficult to transfer across firms
and sectors.
To diversify their business firms may rely on internal growth (e.g., new subsidiaries or
divisions) or external growth (M&As, joint ventures and other collaborative agreements). This
paper does not focus on the factors which affect the choice between different forms of growth -
vertical or lateral integration, internal or external growth. In general, external growth may be
thought of as a natural channel of diversification. Through external linkages, firms may gain
access to scientific or technical knowledge required to develop new products. In a world of rapid
technical change and increasing knowledge multidisciplinarity, it is difficult for a single firm to
develop internal capabilities in many different fields. Thus, firms are spurred to set up linkages
with external sources of knowledge, including the acquisition of firms endowed with specific
capabilities.
Moreover, firms may seek to reach new markets through agreements or M&As with the aim to
enjoy increasing returns to scale and scope from the use of their "excess resources", including
technical knowledge. In this case, the choice of agreements or M&As as an alternative to internal
growth may reflect the need to reduce the time and the costs for the accumulation of
complementary capabilities (e.g., sales and post-sales service networks). Furthermore, the choice
between non-equity agreements or minority participations and M&As may depend on the level of
idiosyncrasy and market specificity of complementary capabilities. If there are economies of
scope at the level of R&D activities but not at the level of commercialisation or post-sales
services, diversification by collaboration will be more efficient than M&As. In these
circumstance, two firms may set up a R&D joint venture and commercialise the results through
their independent sales network. This solution allows a high level of autonomy to each business
unit and reduce possible managerial diseconomies due to a large scale of operations.Liuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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3. Data and methodology
The analysis of the firm external linkages and corporate reorganisations in this paper focuses
on 18 European firms specialised in software and computer services. The growth strategies of
these firms were compared with those of 20 American software and computer services firms. Our
analysis draws on a database containing 997 operations concerning the sample firms. Integrated
software and hardware firms (e.g., IBM, Siemens and Olivetti) are not included in the database.
The operations were conducted by the sample firms during the period between 1984 and 1992.
640 of these operations are external linkages - joint ventures (JV), minority participations,
licensing agreements, others collaborative agreements, mergers and acquisitions (M&A). There
are 275 operations which refer to internal corporate changes - creation and shutdown of new
subsidiaries, and other internal reorganisations (e.g., the merger of two divisions, jobs cuts or
improvements). 82 operations concern the stipulation of new contracts (particularly with large
customers).
Firms were selected from the International Data Corporation (IDC) classification of the
largest European and North American software and services firms operating in Europe in 1989.
The sample includes the largest European firms in 1990, such as CAP Gemini Sogeti (France),
Finsiel (Italy), SD-Scicon (UK-France) and Software AG (Germany) from six EU countries -
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and UK. As Table 1 shows, European firms are
specialised in computer services, except for SAP and Software AG of Germany which specialise
in packaged software. Finally, the sample includes the largest US firms such as Microsoft,
Computer Associates, Oracle and Lotus. In contrast with their European counterparts, US firms
specialise in packaged software - only five sample firms specialise in computer services.
The data on firms' growth have been collected from Predicast database, which is based on
information drawn from press sources (see references). Firms for which information is provided
are classified by Predicast according to their main business area. The sample firms wereSalvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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classified under the SIC codes 7370 to 7379 (packaged software and computer and data
processing services). Each operation is also classified by Predicast according to SIC
classification. This allows the comparison between the firms' area of business and the business
sector of each operation. Finally, Predicast provides information about the partner(s), its
nationality (although not systematically), and a brief description of the operation. On the basis on
this qualitative information, a database was set up. This provides the following data: four digit
SIC code of the operation, year to which each operation refers, type of operation (M&A, JV,
etc.), country of the partner (or the new subsidiary), number of citations in the press, content
(R&D, Production, Marketing, Financial). These qualitative, nominal-level data were then
transformed into quantitative, ratio-level data. When possible these data have been integrated
with other information from annual reports concerning other structural features of the firms'
economic activities (e.g. sales).
Unfortunately, in the case of software firms data on R&D and annual revenues are available
only for few firms and for some years. This represents a major constraint on the possibility to
account for firm-specific fixed effects.
Revenues in computer software and services in 1989 (or 1990) were utilised as an indicator of
firm competencies in software technology (cf. table 1). Data provided by Datamation and IDC
allow to separate software and services revenues from total revenues. Software and services
represent over 50% of total revenues for all sample firms, except for McDonnel Douglas, which
drew only 2.45% of its total revenues from services (system integration), and Mentor Graphics, a
hardware-software manufacturer has focused its business into software and services - these
represented 39% of its total revenues in 1990 and 74% in 1992 (Datamation, June 15, 1993).
Moreover, many established package producers rely on one or a few products. For instance,
Ashton-Tate in 1990 drew 74% of its revenues from its dBase, a database management system
and Cap Gemini over 95% of its revenues from professional services (IDC, 1990). To analyseLiuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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firm specialisation, I also compared 1990 revenues with the 1983 stock of subsidiaries classified
by SIC code by Predicast's Thesaurus (see references).
Although, in general, revenues or the SIC code of Corporate subsidiaries are not direct
measures of technical competencies, these can be used as a proxy of technical capabilities for
several reasons. One is the lack of other reliable indicators, such as patents and copyright,
particularly for firms specialised in services, which do not make substantial use of these
instruments for the protection of their innovations. Even large software package producers rely on
other means for appropriating the rents of innovations, such as lead time (to reach the market first
with an innovation), continuous product improvements and, to a lesser extent, copyright (Malerba
and Torrisi, 1992; Torrisi, 1994).
Another reason for using sales specialisation as an indicator of technological capabilities is
linked to the nature of software production. In general, firms specialised in a given business
sector may have to accumulate technological capabilities in upstream activities (e.g.,
componentry). However, this is not the case with software because these activities are mostly a
process that produces 'software by means of software'. A software producer or a system
integrator may have to develop new software development tools to improve its production, but
they are unlikely to develop competencies in, for instance, solid state physics or in chemicals. The
number of computer science graduates or system engineers, and mathematicians in principle
provides a more accurate measure of the firm's technological competencies. But this indicator has
also some important drawbacks, including the fact that, for instance, mathematicians or system
engineers can be employed in purely commercial activities, where their scientific and
technological capabilities are not fully exploited.Salvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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4. Firm growth, restructuring and diversification: empirical evidence
4.1. The relative importance of internal and external growth
Table 1 shows the total number of new external linkages (M&A, joint ventures, minority
participations and other agreements) activated by the sample firms during the period 1984-1992.
The sample includes large producers of packaged software like Microsoft, Computer Associates
and SAP, and service providers like McDonnell Douglas and Cap Gemini. Over the period under
consideration, the 18 European firms included in the sample set up on average about 1.6 linkages
per year against about 2.2 of the 20 US firms, as indicated by the third column of table 1. This
difference is related to the different average size of the two groups of firms - there is a positive
correlation between the number of links and firm's size (OLS coefficient = 0.45; t = 4.50).
There are no significant differences across firms with different specialisation in terms of the
propensity to become involved in inter-firm linkages
6
. Among the firms with a propensity
significantly above the average there are service providers, like Logica and Sema-Group, and
firms specialised in software packages, like Novell and Ashton-Tate.
Relevant differences emerge between European and US firms in terms of the geographical
horizon of their linkages. About 63.3% of the linkages set up by European firms involved foreign
partners (either other European firms or non European ones), against 31.4% of the linkages
devised by US firms. This can be easily explained by the large US domestic market compared
with the fragmentation of the European market. Moreover, some large US firms like Andersen
Consulting and Microsoft have probably established long term relationships with foreign partners
before the period under examination. Furthermore, for many European software firms external
linkages have represented an important strategy for reaching a 'minimum' efficient scale that is
required for competing with the larger US firms. Given the limited size of the European nationalLiuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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markets, international linkages may represent an important way to increase the size of business
activities.
Table 1 -   Sales and total external links of the sample firms 
Firm Revenues Total Annual  New  Annual
($ million)(1) linkages average (2) subsids. average
CAP-Gemini-Sogeti 889.20 51 5.67 18 2.00
Finsiel 628.90 15 1.67 1 0.11
SD-Scicon 431.50 11 1.22 1 0.11
Sligos 400.70 24 2.67 1 0.11
Sema Group 378.60 36 4.00 0 0.00
Concept 288.20 7 0.78 0 0.00
Datev 285.10 1 0.11 0 0.00
Hoskyns 277.10 17 1.89 0 0.00
GSI 267.00 4 0.44 1 0.11
Programmator 259.10 2 0.22 0 0.00
Volmac 256.50 7 0.78 0 0.00
Logica 225.40 32 3.56 7 0.78
Telesystemes 212.00 13 1.44 0 0.00
Thorn EMI Software 209.20 2 0.22 1 0.11
SAP 183.10 6 0.67 2 0.22
CGI 166.30 11 1.22 0 0.00
Istel 166.20 10 1.11 1 0.11
Software AG 154.20 11 1.22 3 0.33
Total Europe (and AVG) 260 1.60 36 0.22
SD 1.49 0.48
Microsoft 1323.00 67 7.44 9 1.00
Computer Associate 1310.70 35 3.89 0 0.00
Oracle 1002.00 11 1.22 12 1.33
Lotus Development 664.00 49 5.44 11 1.22
D&B Software Services 539.00 1 0.11 0 0.00
WordPerfect 452.40 4 0.44 1 0.11
McDonnell Douglas 398.00 20 2.22 3 0.33
Novell 388.00 67 7.44 5 0.56
Policy Management 272.00 3 0.33 0 0.00
American Management 261.90 2 0.22 2 0.22
ASK Computer Systems 249.70 4 0.44 0 0.00
SAS Institute 240.00 3 0.33 1 0.11
Autodesk 237.90 12 1.33 4 0.44
Ashton-Tate 230.50 17 1.89 2 0.22
Pansophic Systems 228.80 14 1.56 0 0.00
Cadence Design Systems 178.00 15 1.67 2 0.22
Mentor Graphics 170.00 21 2.33 6 0.67
Computer Sciences 160.00 3 0.33 0 0.00
Sterling Software 155.00 12 1.33 0 0.00
Computer Services             na 18 2.00 1 0.11
Total US (and AVG) 378 2.10 59 0.33
SD 2.25 0.42
Grand Total (and AVG) 638 1.87
SD 1.92
Notes:
(1) 1989 or 1990 revenues.
(2) Average annual links in the period 1984-1992. Total external links include mergers and 
acquisitions, joint ventures, minority partecipations, licensing agreements and other agreements.Salvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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Table 2.a shows the evolution of different types of external links made by the European firms
over the period in examination. Agreements (joint ventures, minority participations, licensing
agreements and other agreements) represent 60% of total external operations, against 40% of
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Total external operations have increased over this period,
showing that the sample firms increasingly rely on external sources of technical and market-
specific knowledge. Table 2.b shows a similar pattern for the US firms. However, these relied
more on M&As than agreements until 1989, while their European counterparts mostly focused on
agreements (cf. figures 1.a and 1.b).
Table 2.a -  External Links and Corporate Change - European Firms
     1984 - 86 1987 - 89 1990 - 92 1984 - 1992        %    CAGR (2)
Total external links 50 100 110 260 100.00 10.97
of which:
Mergers & Acquisitions 12 41 51 103 39.62 29.68
Agreements (1) 38 59 59 157 60.38 6.26
Corporate change 42 28 47 117 100.00 -6.76
of which:
New subsidiaries 23 6 7 36 30.77 -14.99
Sold subsidiaries 2 3 5 10 8.55 10.40
Disinvestements 7 10 13 30 25.64 -8.29
Reorganisations 10 9 22 41 35.04 9.05
Table 2.b.  External Links and Corporate Change - US Firms
     1984 - 86 1987 - 89 1990 - 92 1984 - 1992        %   CAGR (2)
Total external links 73 88 217 378 100.00 34.00
of which:
Mergers & Acquisitions 47 61 45 153 40.48 13.00
Agreements (1) 26 27 172 225 59.52 43.00
Corporate change 34 56 67 157 100.00 -1.00
of which:
New subsidiaries 15 14 30 59 37.58 -2.00
Sold subsidiaries 2 3 6 11 7.01 0.00
Disinvestements 4 18 13 35 22.29 0.00
Reorganisations 13 21 18 52 33.12 8.88
Notes
(1) Agreements include joint ventures, minority partecipations, licensing agreements and other agreements
(2) Percentage annual compound growth rate 1984-1992, except for sales of subsidiaries by European firms 
and disinvestments by US firms (1985-1992). The growth rate of reorganisations by US firms was calculated
for the period 1985-1991. Liuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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These differences reflect the different specialisation of US and European firms. As mentioned
before, a large domestic market and other factors have prompted US firms to specialise in
packaged software. In this market segment firm size is particularly important to achieve
economies of scale and scope, as compared with services and customised software. Thus, US
firms, many of which specialise in packaged software, have a strong incentive to increase their
size through M&As.
By contrast, European firms specialise in services and system integration. For these activities
they have to set up many collaborative agreements with several suppliers of hardware and
software technologies. It is worth noting, however, that the number of collaborative agreements is
larger than M&As for both European and US firms. This reflects the fact that M&As have a
strong impact on the firm's organisation, which has a limited ability to manage an increasingSalvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
17
number of different business units. On the other hand, collaborative agreements in general have a
smaller and less direct impact on corporate organisation compared with M&As.
Tables 2.a and 2.b compare the evolution of external linkages with that of internal corporate
changes or restructuring (new subsidiaries, sale of subsidiaries, dismantling of operations and
reorganisation of activities). Restructuring occurs jointly or as a response to external growth.
Firms that grow by M&A and, to a less extent, agreements have to reorganise the scale and scope
of their activities and may be prompted to modify their organisational structure. However, these
organisational changes show a less regular trend than agreements and M&As over the same
period, for reasons that include a less accurate diffusion of information in the press.
Figures 2.a. and 2.b also compare the evolution of external growth (M&As and agreements)
with internal growth (new subsidiaries), which represent an important share of total internal
corporate changes or restructuring discussed before. Both US and European firms have mostly
centred their growth on external linkages rather than internal growth. This is explained by the
need to reach fast a minimum efficient scale. External linkages allow firms to increase the scale
of their operations (particularly M&As) and to exploit the external economies of being part of a
network of collaborative agreements.
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4.2. The objectives of external linkages
External linkages may be used to face two types of failure in the market for knowledge: the
lack of private incentives to undertake innovations and the lack of capabilities complementary to
innovative skills (e.g., commercialisation capabilities)
7
. Accordingly, external linkages can be
classified as research-oriented linkages, which mainly focus on the first type of market failure,
and market-oriented or complementary resource-seeking linkages, aiming to cope with the
second form of market imperfection.
Research-oriented linkages, may involve rival firms (e.g., consortia for the definition of
common standards or joint R&D agreements) or firms specialised in different stages of a
technological 'filière'. They allow firms to share the risks and the costs associated with the
production of multidisciplinary, complex knowledge, thus increasing the private incentive to
invest in R&D activities. Moreover, they allow the acquisition of new technological capabilities
whose in-house development would require a longer time and higher costs.
Market-oriented linkages are usually set up by firms that operate in different stages of
a technological 'filière' (e.g. operating systems suppliers and turn-key systems
developers) or in different regional markets. They may provide access to complementary
capabilities (e.g., distribution capabilities) that cannot be acquired in the market (becauseSalvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
19
of complex interdependencies between these capabilities and technological or production
capabilities) and cannot be accumulated in-house for various reasons, including the time
required for their accumulation
8. These linkages may help to reduce a specific form of
market failure, that is a socially insufficient production of assets complementary to R&D
capabilities. This has important implications for innovators because the commercial
success of an innovation depends on the supply of specialised and co-specialised inputs
(Teece, 1986, Geroski, 1992). The access to complementary assets may take the form of
M&As, minority participations, joint ventures and other agreements, reflecting the
importance of different factors (including economies of scale and scope, the degree of
complex interdependencies among complementary knowledge and capabilities and
appropriability conditions).
Table 3 shows the main objective of agreements and internal re-organisations. The
operations have been grouped in accordance with the classification discussed earlier:
operations that involve research and development activities (RESEARCH), operations
that do not involve any R&D activity (MARKET) and purely financial operations
(FINANCIAL)
9 . All these operations may involve competitors or firms located in
different stages of this 'technological filiére'.Liuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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Table 3  -   Total external lilnkages and corporate change by objective
                            (1984 - 1992)
European firms
RESEARCH (1) MARKET (2) FINANCIAL TOTAL
       %            %        %        %
Total external links (3) 62 24 186 73 8 3 256 100
Corporate changes (4) 17 14 73 61 29 25 119 100
US firms
RESEARCH (1) MARKET (2) FINANCIAL TOTAL
       %            %        %        %
Total external links (3) 128 34 246 65 2 1 376 100
Corporate changes (4) 16 10 114 73 25 17 155 100
Notes:
(1) Research includes the links with a R&D content.
(2) Market includes all links without any R&D content. Joint production agreements are included
(3) Total links include mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, minority partecipations,
licensing agreements and other agreements. Eight links cannot be classified.
(4) Corporate changes includes new subsidiaries, sold subsidiaries, disinvestments and
reorganisations. One operation cannot be classified.
Over 70% of external operations signed by the European firms were market-oriented, against
about 24% of research-oriented operations involving R&D activities. The sample firms have
signed market-oriented linkages to gain access to specialised commercial assets or service
expertise, and new markets. A case in point is the cross marketing deal between Sema Group and
Finsiel signed in 1992. Active licencing agreements were also classified as market-oriented
operations because they aim to find new markets for the licensor's technology. Examples of
research-oriented linkages are the joint development of a videotext software package for IBM
mainframes by Cap Gemini and IBM in 1984 and the acquisition of 80% stakes of Technologies
Machine Art robot manufacturer by Cap Gemini in 1987.
It is worth noting that the share of research-oriented operations is higher for the US firms as
compared with the European firms (34%). This difference is probably due to the large number of
US firms specialised in packaged software which show a comparatively high involvement in
R&D activities. An insignificant share of total operations have a pure financial content (3% and
1% for the European and the US firms, respectively).Salvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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Overall, the difference between market and research operations was expected. A firm may aim
to set up many external linkages with different partners to achieve economies of scale and scope
in the extensive use of its knowledge and capabilities. By contrast, the number of potential
research partners is limited by the distribution of scientific and technological capabilities across
firms. Moreover, a firm that looks for a research partner may want to focus on few firms
endowed with the best scientific or technical capabilities available on the market.
These data indicate that through external linkages software firms aim to gain access to both
technical knowledge and to more context-specific knowledge (linked to particular, markets, users
and applications). The software firms use different types of external links (from M&A to
technological and co-operative agreements) along with internal investments (e.g., new
subsidiaries). This suggests that there is not a standard model for organising the transactions and
sharing of knowledge in the software industry. Different forms of coordination are adopted
according to the objectives and competencies of firms involved in the knowledge exchange and
pooling. For example, Novell, a US company specialised in Local Area Network (LAN)
operating Systems (NetWare) in 1989 acquired another US firm with competencies in networking
software, Excelan. Novell's NetWare gateway to IBM's SAA network architecture is based on
Excelan expertise (Datamation, June 15, 1994, p. 76). The acquisition in this case is justified by
the relatedness of the two firms' core businesses. A second example is that of Cap Gemini, a large
French firm specialised in computer services which in 1990 jointly developed with Nynex
International, a telecommunication services firm, a network control system for France Telecom.
The complementary capability of these firms and the fact that telecommunication services were
outside Cap Gemini's main business may explain the choice of an agreement as an alternative to
M&A. By contrast, Cap Gemini has resorted to M&As and minority stakes to gain access to the
resources of software firms such as Volmac, Programmator, Hoskyns and Sema Group, whose
activities fall within Cap Gemini's core business.Liuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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The evidence of a large share of external operations aiming at the reorganisation of
commercial networks and the creation of new market opportunities indicates that the diffusion or
replication of the firm's stock of knowledge and competencies on a larger scale represents a major
objective of inter-firm agreements. In a context of high economic complexity and uncertainty
firms are forced to interact with other agents, which are potential sources of tacit knowledge and
specific information. In the computer software industry there is a large number of firms between
software producers and the customers, e.g. distributors, commercial agents, retailers, value-added
retailers, etc. Although with the evolution of the industry some of these firms will probably
disappear, many will survive because, on the whole, they have knowledge of a variety of specific
phases, applications and user needs that no single software producer can economically control. In
some cases, the relationships between those agents and the software producers represent a
traditional division of labour, as in the case of a software package distributor who knows the
evolution of users' requirements and transmits this kind of information to the software producer.
In others, there is a closer interaction, as in the case of a 'value added retailer' who demands
specific product performance and sometimes cooperates in the development of new applications
with suppliers.
A similar share of the operations classified as internal restructuring has a MARKET content
for the European and the US firms (61% and 73% of total internal restructuring operations,
respectively), confirming the importance of commercialisation activities in this industry and the
linkages between internal growth and internal restructuring. Unlike external operations, a large
share of internal restructuring operations shows a financial dimension, particularly for the
European firms (25% of total operations against 17% of the US firms) (see table 3). This
category of internal restructuring includes equity issues to finance firms' expansion, management
acquisitions of share capital, etc. It is worth noting that, besides the management and other
company stockholders, operations with a financial object often involve external institutions. ForSalvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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instance, in 1984 Cap Gemini announced that 37.5% of its stake would be acquired by the
company management, in 1986 issued shares and convertible bonds to finance its growth and in
1987 was acquired for 8% of its stakes by Financiere Suez.
4.3. The trajectories of growth in software firms
Table 4 shows external operations (separated into M&As and agreements) classified into three
categories: operations in the firm's main business, operations in related business sectors
(computer hardware, telecommunications equipment and services or electronic components), and
operations in unrelated business sectors. The latter also include general corporate consulting (for




European firms in the sample signed over 76% of total external linkages in the area of their
main business (SIC code 7370 to 7379). Only 2% of total external linkages were made in
unrelated business sectors. The remaining linkages focused on related sectors (about 20% of total
linkages). A similar pattern is shown for the US firms.
A large share of agreements in the area of the firms' main business also emerges when one
looks at the number of agreements with an R&D content. About 77% of the RESEARCH
linkages (both M&A and agreements) were signed in the main business by the European firms,
against about 20% of RESEARCH links in related business sectors and only 3% in unrelated
business sectors. Moreover, there are no significant differences between RESEARCH and
MARKET links with respect to the area of business. The US and European firms, again, show a
similar pattern of diversification through external linkages.
Some differences emerge between M&A and agreements with respect to this issue.
Agreements represent a privileged channel for diversifying into related business sectors compared
with M&A, particularly for the European firms (28% of their total agreements were drawn up in
sectors related to the firms' main business against 12% of M&A).  This may be explained by theLiuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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fact that agreements are a more flexible form of investment as compared with M&A in that they
generate less 'sunk' costs. Therefore, they may be utilised to monitor related business areas or
new market niches and as an option. However, the majority of agreements are also in the firm's
core business and in related sectors (only 3% are in unrelated sectors).
Finally, our empirical analysis indicates that external and internal growth do not differ
significantly with respect to the direction of diversification.
So far we have described the diversification of external linkages during the period 1984-1992.
The next step of our analysis is centred on the relationship between this pattern of diversification
and diversification before 1984.
Table 5 compares the diversification of 1983 subsidiaries with that of external growth during
1984-1992. The diversification is measured with the specialisation rate and the Herfindhal index.
Table 4. a -  External Links by Distance from the Firms'  Main Business - European firms
(1984 - 1992)
Links in the  Links in  Links in Total 
main business related business  unrelated  links (1)
sector sectors sectors   
     %     %     %     %
Tot. external links 190 76 55 22 5 2 250 100
of which:
Mergers & Acquisitions 85 87 12 12 1 1 98 100
Agreements (2) 105 69 43 28 3 3 152 100
Table 4. b  -  External Links by Distance from the Firms'  Main Business - US firms
(1984 - 1992)
Links in the  Links in  Links in Total 
main business related business  unrelated  links (1)
sector sectors sectors   
     %     %     %     %
Tot. external links 285 78 72 20 7 2 364 100
of which:
Mergers & Acquisitions 128 83 25 16 1 1 154 100
Agreements (2) 157 75 47 22 6 3 210 100
Notes:
(1) 24 external links cannot be classified. 
(2) Agreements include joint ventures, minority partecipations, licensing agreements and other
agreements.Salvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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Table  5.a  - 1983 diversification and 1984-1992 external growth (mergers & acquisitions) - European firms
Hsub1983 H1984-92 SR83 SR1984-92 HM&A84-92 HAgr84-92 SRM&A8492SRAgr8492
CAP-Gemini-Sogeti 0.57 0.73 0.73 0.84 0.80 0.67 0.88 0.79
Finsiel 1.00 0.68 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.64 1.00 0.77
SD-Scicon (1) 0.68 0.50 0.80 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.50
Sligos (2) 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.83 0.88 0.56 0.93 0.67
Sema Group (3) 0.63 0.54 0.75 0.67 0.50 0.56 0.67 0.67
Concept (4) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Datev (4) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00
Hoskyns Group 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.86
GSI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Programmator 0.56 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 -
Volmac 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.83
Logica 0.52 0.73 0.60 0.84 0.72 0.73 0.83 0.84
Telesystemes 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.58 0.50 0.70
Thorn EMI Software (5) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 -
SAP (4) 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.67
CGI (4) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Istel (6) 1.00 0.46 1.00 0.60 0.52 0.68 0.60 0.80
Software AG 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.68 1.00 0.80
AVG 0.86 0.77 0.90 0.84 0.80 0.65 0.84 0.72
SD 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.29
Table  5.b  - 1983 diversification and 1984-1992 external growth (mergers & acquisitions) - US firms
Hsub1983 H1984-92 SR83 SR1984-92 HM&A84-92 HAgr84-92 SRM&A8492SRAgr8492
Microsoft 1.00 0.53 1.00 0.67 0.59 0.53 0.71 0.67
Computer Associate 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Oracle Corp. 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.68 1.00 0.80
Lotus Development 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.89 0.79 0.82 0.88 0.90
D&B Software Services 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 -
WordPerfect (4) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
McDonnell Douglas (7) 1.00 0.44 1.00 0.54 0.46 1.00 0.58 1.00
Novell 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.83 0.88 0.68 0.93 0.80
Policy Management Sys. 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00
American Management 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00
ASK Computer Systems 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.56 1.00 0.67 1.00
SAS Institute 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 -
Autodesk (4) 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.83 0.78 0.63 0.88 0.75
Ashton-Tate 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Pansophic Systems 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cadence Design Systems 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.64 0.72 0.50 0.83 0.50
Mentor Graphics 1.00 0.51 1.00 0.55 0.56 0.78 0.67 0.88
Computer Sciences 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Sterling Software 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.83 0.78 0.63 0.88 0.75
Computer Services 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.60 0.50
AVG 0.98 0.76 0.98 0.82 0.76 0.74 0.81 0.78
SD 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.19 0.27 0.32 0.25 0.31
Notes
(1) - The number of 1983 subsidiaries was calculated by aggregating the subsidiaries of Systems Designers (SD) and Scicon 
Scicon Computer Services, which was taken over by SD in 1988 from British Petroleum.
(2) - In 1983 Sligos was a Tymshare's subsidiary, a US computer services firms, acquired by Mac Donnel Douglas in 1985.
(3) - Sema Group was born in 1989 by the merger between the British UK CAP Group and the French Sema Metra. 
(4) - Predicasts' data available for 1990 or 1992. 
(5) Thorn-Emi Software was created after 1983 by Thorn-EMI, which in 1983 had four subsidiaries in the computer sector.
(6) In 1983 Istel was a British Leyland's subsidiary (BL Systems).  It was acquired by AT&T in 1989. 
(7) - Formerly McDonnel Douglas's Data Suystem division
(8) H = Herfindal index was calculated for 1983 subsidiaries (Hsub1983), total external operations (H1984-92), M&As  
(HM&A8492) and Agreements (HAgr84-92).  SR= specialisation rate (percentage of the largest line of business) was
calculated for 1983 subsidiaries and 1984-92 external operations.Liuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
26
The first is the share of the firm's largest sector, while the latter is the sum of the squares of
the shares of the variable. In this case the Herfindal index was calculated on three classes
corresponding to the main business, related sectors and unrelated sectors. The Herfindhal then
varies between 0.33 (max diversification - equal shares) to 1 (maximum specialisation - share of
the highest sector equal to 1). This analysis was also performed by using another measure of
diversification - entropy (sum of the logs of one over shares of the variable in each class). These
produce very similar results.
All firms, except for Cap Gemini, Programmator, Logica and Pansophic, increased or
maintained stable their diversification degree during the 1984-1992 compared with 1983. This is
shown by the comparison of the Herfindal index (H) and the specialisation rate (SR) for total
1984-1992 external growth operations with the corresponding indexes for 1983 subsidiaries.
This comparison, however, confirms that the majority of external operations have centred on
software activities, thus reinforcing the starting specialisation. The average SR index is above
80% and its minimum value is 53% for the US firms (Computer Services) and 55% for their
European counterparts (SD-Scicon). As expected, agreements are more diversified than M&As
for reasons discussed above. But, again, over 70% of total agreements focused on computer
software and services.
It is interesting to note the different degree of specialisation of US firms compared with
European firms in 1983. All US software firms, excepted one (Pansophic), were perfectly
specialised in 1983. By contrast, European firms were more diversified (the average H83 is 0.86
compared with 0.98 for US firms). This difference may depend on two factors. First, the large
extension and homogeneity of the US market which has favoured the achievement of economies
of scale and specialisation by local firms. Second, the large number of US firms which entered
the market as start-ups early in the 1980s. Firms such as Lotus Development, founded by people
spun off from Visicalc in 1981, Autodesk (founded in 1982) and Sterling Software (1983) haveSalvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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grown during the 1980s by exploiting the high technological and market opportunities arising
from software activities and related ones (including computers). The presence of network
externalities has represented an important reinforcing mechanism which has given rise to
increasing returns and the emergence of market leaders which have built their fortune on few
software products (packages). For instance, Microsoft in 1994 held over one-third of the world
market for personal computer's applications (Business Week, January 9, 1995, p. 46).
In Europe, many software firms have spun off from electronics and non electronics firms,
often maintaining close links with their parent companies. For example, Finsiel was affiliated to
Istituto Bancario S. Paolo and IRI in 1983, Scicon Computers was taken over by Systems
Designers (SD) from British Petroleum in 1988, and Istel was a British Leyland's subsidiary (BL
Systems) in 1983. These firms did not have a market large enough to allow a degree of
specialisation and growth comparable to that of their US counterparts. Moreover, as mentioned
before, most of them have positioned in different market niches of limited size by offering
customised, ad hoc software and professional services for large customers. In some cases, their
largest customer is still the parent company (e.g., the public administration for Finsiel) and most
revenues arise from the regional or national market. The opportunities to enter the larger, global
market for packaged software were limited by the early entry and market pre-emption by the US
firms.
External growth during the period 1984-1992 made European and US firms more similar than
in 1983. On average, both European and US firms have become more diversified. To a closer
look, however, few software firms, including those that have grown fast through M&As and other
external linkages, have tried to diversify their activities in businesses unrelated to software
activities. Few software firms have tried to enter the computer (hardware) business. For instance,
Cap Gemini has acquired IBAT, a process control and robotics manufacturer in 1986. In the
same year, Microsoft has acquired Citation, a CD-ROM manufacturers, and has subsequentlyLiuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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increased its efforts in the multimedia business. In 1992 Microsoft signed an agreement with
Compaq Computer to joint develop computer audio functions and Novell has signed a agreement
with Stratus to joint develop fail-tolerant PC networks.
Another target of diversification for software firms were telecommunication services such as
electronic mail. This is the case of the joint ventures between Computer Associates and MCI
Communications in 1986 and with Radio Schweiz in 1989. In 1984 Mc Donnel Douglas
announced a joint venture with Marubeni of Japan for the development of value added network
services and in 1985 Scicon acquired 80% of Telecom International, a satellite communications
company.
4.3. Discussion
During the 1980s and part of the 1990s software firms tried to increase the scale of their
operations through external growth and internal restructuring. Scale is particularly important in
market for software packages, where market concentration is relatively high and the market
leaders are all US firms. In customised software and services, where European firms specialise,
size is increasingly important as well. This explains the importance of market-oriented linkages.
External linkages enable firms to increase the size of their operations and to achieve economies of
scale and scope. This is true in particular for firms which have made significant investments in
structured development methodologies and have developed large libraries of documentation and
programs that can be re-used for different customers. The fixed costs associated with these
intangible assets are an important source of economies of scale and scope which can be exploited
through either direct commercial channels or indirect channels, like in the case of minority
participations or non-equity commercial agreements with other service providers located in a
specific market.
Software firms have not diversified in unrelated business sectors, except for few cases such as
Microsoft's acquisition of 26% share of the book publisher Dorling Kindersley in 1991. SimilarSalvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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to other forms of knowledge acquisition (e.g., innovative or imitative R&D), the absorption of
new information through the establishment of external links is a costly activity that requires
previous investments in evalutation and absorptive capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). The
costs of acquisition of knowledge are positively related to the distance between the firm's stock of
knowledge and the new information. Besides the computational and organisational costs
associated with the acquisition of new pieces of information, there are additional costs due to the
evaluation of the quality of information (which increase with the distance from the firm's stock of
knowledge)
11
. This is one explanation for the difficulties to diversify shown by several firms from
different sectors. In the history of the computer and software industry there are several examples
of attempts at diversifying business activities. Philips is a notable one: after several attempts to
remain in the computer industry (including numerous agreements) it has abandoned this sector to
focus on its main business (which is still quite diversified). During the 1980s many firms in the
IT sector re-focused their activities too. Despite technological convergence among different
branches of the IT sector, most attempts to diversify through alliances and M&As between firms
specialised in telecommunications, computers and electronic components have failed (e.g., IBM's
acquisition of Rolm). A major reason for these failures is linked to the high fixed costs to acquire
market and user-specific knowledge, which give rise to increasing returns to scale. For instance,
the limited market share of Rolm has not enabled IBM to reach the minimum efficient scale in the
market for private branch exchange (Gambardella and Torrisi, 1996).
Some software firms have also re-focused their activities after attempts at diversifying
within the same software sector. For instance, in 1989 Pansophic, a US firms specialised
in system software, tried to diversify into graphics applications but it failed because, as
claimed by its chief executive, the firm 'got dispersed' (Datamation, 1991, p. 128). This
failure may be linked to different reasons, including the costs and time for the acquisition
of technological and market knowledge, and managerial bottlenecks. More recently, CapLiuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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Gemini, a computer service provider which grew through M&As during the 1980s, has
started a restructuring plan to sell activities outside its core business, including Cisi, a
French computer services firms acquired few years before (Tribune-Cote-Desfosses,
March 10, 1994, p. 12). Finally, SD-Scicon has sold its US energy systems business to
Combustion Engineering in 1988, its scientific control systems subsidiary to Cap Gemini
in 1990 and its artificial intelligence activities to former employees (which founded a new
firm, Integrated Solutions) to focus on manufacturing process control systems and
financial communications services (Computer Weekly, 1990).
Finally, many software firms (e.g., Cap Gemini and Logica) have refocused their
activities towards telecommunication services and multimedia. The business area
resulting from the convergence between software and telecommunication services
creates new windows of opportunities for new firms and established firms, including
Europen services providers. This explains the number of external linkages established by
the sample firms in this field.
5. Conclusions
This paper has analysed the process of growth and external linkages of large European
software firms in comparison with their US counterparts. This is a relatively young industry that
grows rapidly at an annual rate which is high compared with other IT segments, including
computers. Important factors that have shaped the evolution of this industry and the
specialisation of software producers are represented by the positive externalities coming from
technological convergence, the unbundling of software sales from that of hardware products and
the rising complexity of software applications which have spurred the outsourcing of software
activities from many user firms.Salvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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The conclusions emerging from the analysis can be summarised as follows.
First, the analysis of the collaborative agreements and other external growth
operations provides some insights into the reasons why software firms set up these
linkages. A large share of these external links represent for the sample firms a way to
reach new markets and to exploit economies of scale and scope in the use of the firm's
stock of knowledge (market-oriented links). These operations provide software firms
with the access to complementary capabilities that they do not possess (and maybe they
do not have incentives to develop) in-house. A smaller number of external growth
operations aim to absorb or develop jointly new technological knowledge (research-
oriented links). These linkages provide firms with private incentives to undertake
innovative activity that they would not try alone. Both market and research-oriented
links give firms the opportunity to exchange and share imperfectly codifiable knowledge
and to allow for informal and tacit knowledge that cannot be organised through the
market mechanism.
Second, this study shows that software firms have increased their diversification
through external growth during the period in examination. However, at a closer analysis
most operations appeared to focus on technologically related activities (e.g.,
telecommunication services). Moreover, there are not significant differences among
different forms of external growth with respect to the directions of diversification.
Although collaborative agreements, particularly joint R&D agreements, are more
diversified than M&As, they also focus on software and related businesses. This
contrasts the hypothesis that collaborative agreements, particularly joint research
agreements and minority stakes, represent an important way to explore unfamiliar
business sectors. The evidence provided in the paper may be explained by the highLiuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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growth rate of the software market which offers significant investment opportunities
compared with other sectors. Moreover, there are decreasing returns to unrelated
diversification due to loss of managerial control, misallocation of internal resources and
organisational inertia that firms may experience even when they diversify in related
businesses, as showed by some examples mentioned in this paper. Future research on this
topic should try to test more carefully the association between decreasing returns to
diversification and the factors mentioned above.
Finally, the differences between US and European firms are significant in terms of
their production profile and the degree of 1983 diversification. European firms were
more diversified in 1983: many of them belonged to an electronics or non electronics
group and focused on computer services. By contrast, US firms were very specialised.
Most of them produced one or few software packages and did not belong to any
industrial group. The different diversification degree between US and the European firms
has reduced as a consequence of the 1984-1992 operations. However, European and US
software firms have maintained their different product profile. In particular, only one
European firm, SAP of Germany, has maintained an international position as a producer
of software packages (Software AG, the second German software packages producer in
1990, has recently re-focused its activities towards services). The remaining firms have
reinforced their activities in computer services and, more recently, have diversified in
telecommunication services. On the other hand, US firms have maintained a leading
market position in either software packages or services. This shows the difficulty of
diversifying from software services to packaged software. Most of this difficulty arises
from the strength of increasing returns in the production of software packages which isSalvatore Torrisi, Firm specialisation and growth. A study of the european software industry.
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linked to dynamic economies scale and network externalities. Moreover, the commercial
capabilities required in services and packaged software are very different.Liuc Papers, n. 35, novembre 1996
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2
 IBM represents an exception to this trend towards vertical disintegration of software and services. Its
share of software and services increased from 17% to 28% between 1981 and 1992 (Datamation,
June 15, 1982 and 1993).
3
 The latter agreement has not been concluded for various reasons, including Olivetti's serious financial
difficulties showed since 1991.
4
 Another research line has focused on transaction costs. This literature explains the degree of vertical
(or lateral) integration and the division of labour among firms as a function of variables such as the
frequency of transactions, asset specificity and appropriability of innovative rents (Williamson, 1975;
Teece, 1986).
5
 However, the separation between propriety and control may cause excessive diversification. To
maximise their utility function, managers may push diversification beyond the level which is optimal
for firm's profitability (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
6
 At this level of the analysis I refer to total external linkages for the sake of simplicity. Later, the
differences between different types of external linkages will be explored. Chi-squared statistics shows
that there is not any significant association between firm's specialisation and external linkages. Chi-
square was also calculated for agreements, mergers & acquisitions and new subsidiaries. Finally, chi-
squared test indicates no association between the nationality of the firm (European or US) and the
variables mentioned before.
7
 In economic literature, imperfections in the market for knowledge are associated with the public good
nature of knowledge and with imperfect information (and its consequences such as adverse selection
and moral hazard). More recently, the literature has analysed knowledge as an imperfect public
good, by pointing to the fact that knowledge, even the scientific, codified one, is rarely available off-
the-shelf. This explains why firms accumulate "absorptive capabilities" which are used to monitor
and utilise external sources of knowledge (see  Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, Rosenberg, 1990, and
Pavitt , 1991b).
8
 The economic literature has provided other explanations for the adoption of alternative organisation of
economic activities which draw on transaction costs (Williamson, 1975).
9
 MARKET operations may include commercial and production activities. RESEARCH operations may
include production and commercial activities.
10
 The analysis of internal growth shows similar results.
11
We do not take into account the costs of monitoring the behaviour of the supplier of knowledge. These
costs may induce firms to internalise the source of knowledge through M&As. But vertical
integration does not necessarily reduce these costs because of asymmetric information and moral
hazard. After all, there are not sufficient reasons to believe that "integration transforms a hostile
supplier into a docile employee" (Grossman and Hart, 1986, p. 693).